This paper establishes the existence of equilibrium result of a class of mean field games with singular controls, which arise in optimal portfolio liquidation and optimal exploitation of exhaustible resource. The interaction is through both states and controls. A relaxed solution approach is used. We prove the existence of equilibria by first considering the corresponding mean field games with continuous controls instead of singular controls and then taking approximation.
Introduction
Mean field games (MFGs) with singular controls were introduced in [20] , in which we consider general MFGs with singular controls and establish the existence of equilibria result by a probabilistic approach. Analytically, [24] and [25] characterized the equilibria of MFGs with singular controls of bounded velocity and mean field fuel follower games in infinite horizon, respectively. By now, all results on MFGs with singular controls are based on models with the interaction through states and there is no result on MFGs with singular controls under strategic interaction, to the best of our knowledge. In this paper, motivated by optimal portfolio liquidation and optimal exploitation of exhaustible resource (see Section 2) we consider the following MFGs with singular controls                                    1. For fixed probability measures µ := (µ (1) , µ (2) , µ (3) ) in some suitable space solve the optimization probelm : minmize J(u, Z (1) , Z (2) ; µ) such that 
t , u t ) dt + α (1) dZ
2. Search for the fixed point µ = (L(Z (1) ), L(Z (2) ), L(X (3) ))
where Z (1) , Z (2) and X (3) are the optimal control and state from 2, t− + x) dx
t− + x) dx
t , X
t , µ t , u t ) dt + g(X
T , X
T ) .
(1.2)
In (1.1) and (1.2) , N is a compensated Poisson process and W (1) and W (2) are two Brownian motions defined on some probability space. u is the regular (absolutely continuous) control and Z (1) and Z (2) are singular controls, whose trajectories are non-decreasing. ∆X t is the jump of X at t. µ (i) is the first moment of µ (i) , i = 1, 2 and L(·) is the law of ·.
Differently from standard MFGs as introduced in [31] and [27] , where the interaction is only through the control, the interaction of MFG (1.1) is not only through states X (1) , X (2) and X (3) , but also through singular controls Z (1) and Z (2) . Strictly speaking, our MFG (1.1) belongs to extended MFGs; see [11, 23] for results based on probabilistic and analytical approaches, respectively. We apply the relaxed solution method (probabilistic compactification method) 1 to establish the existence of equilibrium result.
The application of the relaxed solution method in MFGs stems from [29] . Later it is used to prove existence of equilibria for MFGs with common noise [10] , MFGs with singular controls [20] , MFGs with controlled jumps [4] , MFGs with absorption [7, 8] , MFGs with finite states [14] among others. The idea of this method is first establishing the upper hemi-continuity of the representative agent's best response correspondence to a given µ using Berge's maximum theorem, and then to apply the Kakutani-FanGlicksberg fixed point theorem in order to establish the existence of some measure-valued process µ * such that the law of the agents state or strategy process under a best response to µ * coincides with that process; for details, one can refer to the lecture note [30] .
In addition to [20] , the work highly related to the current paper is [4] since our state X (3) in (1.1) is a reminisence of MFGs with controlled jumps. However, the existence of singular control makes the problem essentially different from [4] . In particular, Skorokhod J 1 topology used in [4] does not work for (1.1). Motivated by [20] (one dimensional case) and [22] (multidimensional case), the suitable topology is Skorokhod M 1 topology. Bacially speaking, there are two M 1 topologies, the strong one and the weak one. They coincide with each other for one dimensional paths, which are the usual objectives in the literature; see [3, 17, 20, 32] among others. For multidimensional paths weak M 1 has an advantage over the strong M 1 since the oscillation function for weak M 1 is always 0 for monotone paths; see [2, 16, 22] . So in this paper, by M 1 topology we always mean weak M 1 topology unless otherwise stated. For the detailed definition and properties of weak M 1 topology, one could refer to the book [34, Chapter 12] ; see also the recent interesting work [16, Section 3] for a summary.
Due to the regularity of singular controls, the relaxed solution method, which might not work for extended MFGs with regular controls, still works for (1.1). Consequently, the states in (1.1) are allowed to be degenerate. The property of degeneracy is important in applications like optimal liquidation; see Section 2. The difficulty comes from the possible simultaneous jumps of two singular controls and the Poisson process in different directions. The Skorokhod space endowed with M 1 topology is not a vector space in the sense that if x n → x and y n → y in M 1 , it is not necessarily true that x n + y n → x + y in M 1 . One possible condition to make it true is x and y do not admit simultaneous jumps in different directions, i.e., ∆x t ∆y t ≥ 0. Thus, the jumps in different directions of singular controls and the Poisson integral make it difficult to implement convergence and relative compactness arguments under M 1 topology. To circumvent this difficulty, we take a two-step strategy: in step 1, instead of considering Z (1) and Z (2) we consider their continuous counterparts k
s ds and k
s ds. The resulting MFG indexed by k admits only one jump resource, which is the Poisson process. Although in this step Skorokhod J 1 topology works as well, we prefer to proceed with M 1 topology because the same argument will be frequently used in step 2, in which we show the sequence of equilibria indexed by k from step 1 helps construct an equilibrium of (1.1) by approximation. The approximation from step 1 to step 2 holds only under M 1 but not J 1 topology as M 1 topology allows convergence of unmatched jumps. Note that the approximant k · ·−1/k Z s ds was also used in [20] , where we want to establish a relationship between MFG with singular controls and MFG with regular controls. In [20] , we assume processes do not admit jumps at the terminal time T . In the current paper we drop this assumption by considering a slightly different MFG on a possibly larger horizon in step 1 and assume the coefficients to be trivially extended to this larger horizon in step 2.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we introduce two motivating examples in Section 2. In Section 3 we introduce the model setup and our two main results: the existence of equilibrium result of (1.1) with finite fuel constraint and the existence of equilibrium result of (1.1) with general singular controls but in one dimension. The proofs of the first and the second main results are given in Section 4 and Section 5, respectively.
Motivation

Optimal Portfolio Liquidation
In classic liquidation models, a large trader would like to unwind her open position by submitting market orders in blocked shape into the order book. Due to the limited liquidity, the large orders would move the order book in an unfavorable direction, making the immediate execution costly. However, slow trading may result in high inventory risk due to the market uncertainty. Thus, the trader needs to make a decision of the trading rate in order to minimize her trading cost (or maximize her net profit). One can refer to [3, 26] among others for liquidation with singular controls. Recently, liquidation models beyond single player especially MFGs of optimal liquidation has drawn a lot of attention; see e.g. [9, 12, 13, 19, 21, 28] , the common nature of which is the trading price is influenced not only by the individual trader's strategy but also by the aggregation of the competitors' strategies.
So far MFGs of optimal liquidation has only focused on absolutely continuous strategies. In the first example, we introduce a model of optimal portfolio liquidation with singular controls, which is a variant of [26] . Instead of describing the trading price, it is more convenient to consider the spread directly. We assume the buy spead X (1) and the sell spread X (2) of a representative player follow the dynamics
respectively,
Here, Z (1) and Z (2) are the accumulative market buy and sell orders until time t, respectively. ν (1) and ν (2) are the aggregated (mean-field) market buy and sell orders of competitors. We assume players trade different stocks and the aggregation of strategies influences the representative player's spread through a spillover effect. ρ (1) and ρ (2) describe the resilience of the order book. In addition to submitting market orders in the traditional venue, the representative player also submits passive orders into the dark pool, where the execution is uncertain. Thus, the current position X (3) follows
where N is a Poisson process, and u is the net amount of passive orders submitted into the dark pool.
By selling Z (2) and buying Z (1) blocked shares of orders, the liquidity cost together with the cost crossing the spread is
s .
The cost of spillover effect is
The ratio coefficients κ (1) /η (1) and κ (2) /η (2) , coming from the dynamcis of the spreads, reflect the weight of influence between the aggregation and the individual strategy. In mathematics, it makes the total cost continuous, where the total (scaled) cost is
where the quadratic terms
s ) 2 ds and ̺(X 
Optimal Exploitation of Exhaustible Resources
In the second example, we consider a MFG of optimal exploitation of exhaustible resource. A model with infinite horizon and without game nature was introduced in [18] . We introduce a model among infinite players with mean-field interaction and finite horizon. The problem describes how an energy company determines her exploitation amount optimally in order to maximize her net profit, in face of the competition with a continuum of companies producing similar and alternative energy.
The reservoir of the resource is described as
where Z t is the accumulative amount of exploitation until time t. The market price of the resource is determined by three parts: the first part is generated from the market itself and noise traders. It is 2 Note that the coefficient λ can be price-sensitive so that the quadratic term T 0 λsν 2 s ds might not be exogenous.
assumed to be a mean-reverting dynamic. When there is no exploitation activity, the price would recover to the mean level. The second part comes from the company's sales. Once selling, the company moves the price in an undesirable direction due to the illiquidity of the exhaustible resource. The third part arises from the alternative products. Any exploitation of the alternative resource would make the price of the resource decline. We assume the price impact to be in a linear form. Hence, the actual market price of the resource follows the dynamic
where ν is the aggregated (mean field) exploitation of the alternative products. This price dynamic can be compared with [15, equation (1)]. The net profit is
) be the coordinate processes on Ω m , i.e., 
The space Ω m is equipped with the product σ-algebra
is the σ-algebra generated by the Π system {{x ∈ D 0,T : (
is the σ-algebra generated by the Π system {{z ∈ A m 0,T :
, n ∈ N} and F Q t is the σ-algebra generated by 1 [0,t] Q, where Q is the coordinate projection from U 0,T to itself, i.e., Q(q) = q for each q ∈ U 0,T .
Metric. Let |y|, x := max 1≤j≤d |x j | and |u| U be the norm of y ∈ R, x ∈ R d and u ∈ U , respectively. 
If there is no confusion about the space we will write W p for simplicity.
Convention. We use the convention that C is a generic constant which may vary from line to line. For a stochastic process X by X ∈ D 0,T we mean X(ω) ∈ D 0,T a.s.; other analogous notation can be understood in the same way. For simplicity of notation, from now on unless otherwise stated, whenever we mention W , µ, Z and X, we mean (
) and (X (1) , X (2) , X (3) ), respectively; the same convention holds for other variants of (W, µ, Z, X) like ( W , µ, Z, X),
t , where π t : x ∈ D 0,T → x t and ν := xν(dx). As usual, for stochastic processes we make the time-argument a subscript while for the coefficients the time argument is in the parentheses. Finally, when m = ∞, we write Ω ∞ , A ∞ 0,T and R ∞ as Ω, A 0,T and R for simplicity.
Definition 3.1. A probability measure P is called a relaxed control with respect to 2. there exists an adapted process Y ∈ D 0,T such that
is the space of all continuous and bounded functions from R d to R with continuous and bounded first-and second-order derivatives,
with
• and for
(1) In [20] , the probability measure P on canonical space is called a control rule. Here we do not distinguish control rule and relaxed control since there is no confusion.
(2) The definition of relaxed controls (control rules) is different from [20] . 
where W (1) and W (2) are two Brownian motions, and N is a compensated Poisson random measure with intensity λ t Q(dt, du). Moreover, two tuples are related by P • (X, Q, Z)
, the corresponding set of relaxed controls is denoted by R m (µ), the cost functional corresponding to a relaxed control P ∈ R m (µ) is
and the (possibly empty) set of optimal relaxed controls is denoted by
If a probability measure P satisfies the fixed point property
then we call P or the associated tuple (Ω m , F , F t , P, X, Q, Z) a relaxed solution to the MFG with sin-
δū t (du)dt) = 1 for some progressively measurable processū, then we call P or the associated tuple (Ω m , F , F t , P, X,ū, Z) a strict solution.
To guarantee the existence of a relaxed solution to (1.1), we make the following assumptions. (2) and b (3) are measurable in t ∈ [0, T ] and there exists a positive
A 2 . The function f is measurable in t ∈ [0, T ] and are continuous with respect to (
for each y ∈ R d and each h i ∈ C 1 (R), the space of continuous functions on R with continuous derivatives.
and
bounded. l is a bounded and measurable functions on [0, T ] × U and continuous in u. Moreover,
A 5 . The functions f is locally Lipschitz continuous with µ uniformly in (t, x, u), i.e., there exists
there holds that
where
A 6 . U is a compact metrizable space.
The following two theorems are our two main results. The proofs of them are given in Section 4 and Section 5, respectively. for each x ∈ R, the following coercive conditions hold
Then there exists a relaxed solution to (1.1) when m = ∞. 
Existence of Equilibria with Finite Fuel Constraint
In this whole section (Section 2.1 and 2.2), we prove the existence of a relaxed solution to MFGs under a finite fuel constraint. That is, unless stated otherwise in this section, we restrict the set of admissible singular controls to the set A As mentioned in the introduction, due to the possible simultaneous jumps of Z (1) , Z (2) and the Poisson process, it is difficult to show the tightness of X (3) . We circumvent the difficulty by spliting the proof of Theorem 3.4 into two parts. In Section 4.1 we prove the existence of equilibria to our MFG by smoothing the singular controls Z (1) and Z (2) . Thus, the tightness of X (3) can be obtained in Section 4.1. The general case is considered in Section 4.2 using an approximation argument. Note that the tightness of X (3) is necessary in Section 4.1 while we do not need it in Section 4.2.
Precisely, in Section 4.1, instead of singular control Z we consider its continuous counterpart Z
The convergence in (4.2) is not necessarily in ( A m 0,T , M 1 ) since T might be a discontinuous time point of Z (i) . So in Section 4.1 the canonical space is chosen as 
In Section 4.1 we work with γ. But for simplicity, we use the notation γ instead of γ. Moreover, in Section 4.1, we consider terminal cost g(X o T +1 ) instead of g(X T ); see Section 4.1 for details.
In order to make MFG in Section 4.1 converge to the original MFG (1.1), in Section 4.2 we make a further assumption that the coefficients are trivially extended from [0, T ] to [0, T + 1], i.e.,
Again, for the simplicity of notation, we identify γ with γ. The trivial extension (4.4) requires the time dependence of coefficients but it does not lose the generality; see Remark 4.13.
Existence of Equilibria with Z [k]
In this part, we replace Z by Z [k] . Due to the continuity of Z [k] , the corresponding MFG and the definition of relaxed controls become less complicated. More precisely, we consider the following MFGs
, solve the optimization probelm : minmize
where Z and X are the optimal control and state from 2. 
and for each φ ∈ C
are continuous P martingale,
is a P martingale with càdlàg path,
The cost functional corresponding to P ∈ R m,[k] (µ) is defined as In the current section, we prove the existence of equilibria for (4.5) for each fixed k. The following result shows that the class of all possible relaxed controls is relatively compact. In a subsequent step this will allow us to apply Berge's maximum theorem. 
is relatively compact in W p , for each fixed k.
Proof. Let {µ n } n≥1 be any sequence in
Since U and A It remains to prove the relative compactness of
follows from Proposition 3.3 that there exist extensions (Ω n ,F n ,F n t , Q n ) of the canonical path space Ω o and processes (X n , Z n , Q n , W n , N n ) defined on it, such that for t ∈ [0, T + 1]
where Z 
Moreover
which implies the existence of K(δ) with lim δ→0 K(δ) = 0 such that
where w is the extended oscillation function of M 1 topology; see [20, Appendix B] .
Finally, by the linear growth of b (3) , boundedness of l, and compactness of U and A m 0,T , and the uniform bound (4.9), it holds that sup The next result states that the cost functional is continuous on the graph
of the multi-function R. This, too, will be needed to apply Berge's maximum theorem below.
Lemma 4.3. Suppose that
Proof. By Lemma 3.3, we have
where (P, X, Z, Q) are defined as in Lemma 3.3 satisfying
which together with (4.11) to (4.12) implies that
Note that f and g are havep-th order growth while P n → P in W p . So next we prove for any (
, it holds that for any p >p
Firstly, for i = 1, 2, 3
Thus, Proposition 3.3 implies the existence of Q n , X n and Z n such that the following estimate hold for i = 1, 2 by the assumptions of the coefficients
Grönwall inequality implies sup
Similarly, we also have sup
Finally, note that 
Proof. In order to verify P ∈ R m,[k] (µ), it is equivalent to check the items in the definition of relaxed controls. Notice first that, for each n, there exists a stochastic process Y n ∈ D 0,T +1 such that
and the corresponding martingale problem is satisfied. By Lemma 3.3, for each n there exists a probability space (Ω n , F n , Q n ) that supports random variables (X n ,Q n ,Z n ), a Poisson random measure N n with intensityQ n t (du)λ t dt, and two Brownian motions W (1),n and W (2),n such that
Thus, the relative compactness ofȲ n (thus the relative compactness of Y n ) follows from the same argument as Lemma 4.2. Therefore, taking a subsequence if necessary, the sequence (X o , Q, Z, Y n ) of random variables taking values in Ω m,o × D 0,T +1 has a weak limit ( X, Q, Z, Y ) defined on some probability space. By Skorokhod's representation theorem, there exists a probability space ( Ω, F , Q) that supports random variables ( X n , Q n , Z n , Y n ) and ( X , Q, Z, Y ) such that
and as elements in the product space
Hence, there exists a stochastic process
,Y,Q are defined in (4.6) and (4.7), respectively. Firstly we verify the martingale property related to (4.6). Note that
in uniform topology, i = 1, 2. 
by (4.14)
by (4.15) and (4.17)
The same result holds for
Next we check the martingale property of M
exists Ω ′ ⊆ Ω with full measure such that for each ω ∈ Ω ′ , Y n t ( ω) → Y t ( ω) for almost every t ∈ [0, T ], which together with Step 2 in the proof of [20, Lemma 3.3] implies that for each ω ∈ Ω and for each F that is continuous and bounded
By the boundedness or linear growth of the coefficients in M φ, X (3),n , Y n , Q n and M φ, X (3) , Y , Q , and the boundedness of F , we have
Thus, up to a subsequence, we have for almost every t ∈ [0, T + 1] that
which implies that for almost every s, t ∈ [0, T + 1] and s < t, and for each F that is continuous, bounded and
by (4.14) ,Y,Q , we have for any 0 ≤ s < t < T + 1
When t = T + 1, the convergence in (4.18) is still true. Indeed, firstly [20, Lemma 3.3] implies
Thus, by dominated convergence it holds that
The next corollary shows that the correspondence R Proof. Let us now define a set-valued map ψ by
Corollary 4.6. Under assumptions
0,T +1 is compact if endowed with the uniform topology, which is equivalent to M 1 in this case. Thus, Let S be defined as forp > p
where C 1 and C 2 are the given by (4.9) and (4.10), respectively, and a non-negative random variable is called a 0,T +1 )×S is non-empty, compact and convex. Moreover, by Corollary 4.6, ψ is nonempty-valued and upper hemicontinuous. Indeed, the non-emptiness is obvious and to check the upper hemi-continuity we take any
0,T +1 ) ×S, Corollary 4.6 implies the existence of subsequence
Skorokhod representation implies the existence of (Q, F , F t ) and R nj := (R (1),nj , R (2),nj ) and R := (R (1) , R (2) ) defined on it such that for i = 1, 2 it holds that 
which implies the upper hemi-continuity of ψ. Therefore, [1, Corollary 17.55 ] is applicable by embedding
, the respective product spaces of all bounded signed measures on C 0,T +1 and D 0,T +1 endowed with weak convergence topology.
Approximation.
In this section, the extension (4.4) is valid throughout. All the limits taken in this section is as k → ∞.
In Section 4.1, we have shown for each fixed k, there is an equilibrium
. In this section, we establish the existence of equilibria of (1.1) by constucting P m, * ∈ R m, * (µ * ) with µ m, * = (
Thus, we have Thus, (4.24) and (4.25) imply the following convergence result
Moreover, (4.21), (4.22), (4.23) and (4.25) imply that
The next lemma shows the admissbility of P * . Proof. The proof is split into two steps. In Step 1, we verify P m, * is supported on the original canonical
space Ω m and we recall Ω
Step 2, we verify the martingale properties.
Step 1 
and the same argument as Lemma 4.2 implies the relative compactness of 
Thus, X ′ (1) ∈ D 0,T . Note that by the uniqueness of the limit X
The same holds for X (2) .
Step 2. In this step, we check M
,µ * can be obtained similarly.
For any n, any bounded and continuous function Φ, by (4.24), (4.26) and dominated convergence it holds up to a subsequence Boundedness and linear growth of the coefficients, compactness of U , (4.30) and dominated convergence yield that
which implies up to a subsequence for almost every (t,
Thus, for almost every (s, t,
n and any continuous and bounded function ϕ which is defined on U 0,T and F Q s measurable we have
where ζ and ζ k are defined as (4.31), and ζ o , ζ k and ζ are defined as follows
By the right continuity of M φ,X (3) ,Y,Q and X (3) we have for any (t,
Finally, using continuous function to approximate indicator function and monotone class theorem we get M φ,X (3) ,Y ,Q is a (P * , (F t ) 0≤t≤T ) martingale.
Lemma 4.9.
) . In particular, we have the convergence of the first order moment, i.e.,
Proof. The definition of Wasserstein metric, boundedness of Z, the convergence (4.2) and (4.27)-(4.29)
from which the convergence of first order moments follows.
Next lemma shows that the cost functional in (1.1) can be rewritten into the form that is more convenient for the convergence argument.
Lemma 4.10. Under assumptions A 1 -A 4 , the cost functional in (1.1) can be rewritten as follows
Proof. By Itô's formula, we have
Taking (4.33) into the cost functional we get
By X T = X T +1 , the desired result follows.
From now on, for simplicity we define for any (P, µ, X, Q)
In particular, by (4.4) it holds that Lemma 4.11. For any P ∈ R m (µ m, * ) with J(P; µ m, * ) < ∞, we can find a sequence
where µ m, * is defined in (4.28).
Proof. The admissibility of P implies the existence of (Ω,F ,P) and (X ,Q,Z,W ,N ) such that
s , (4.36)
,k be the unique strong solution to the following dynamics, respectively,
where we recall µ m,[k], * is the mean field aggregation from Section 4.1. Define 
Therefore,
by (4.38) = J (P, µ m, * , X, Q) by Lemma 4.10 = J(P; µ m, * ).
The following theorem shows µ * defined in (4.28) is an equilibrium of (1.1). 
by (4.24) and (4.26)
by (4.29)
= J(P m, * ; µ m, * ).
Remark 4.13. The trivial extension (4.4) makes the coefficients dependent on the time variable. MFG (1.1) with coefficients that are independent of time can also be considered. Indeed, note that in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 we do not assume any continuity of the coefficients w.r.t. the time variable, so that we can consider the following coefficients γ(s, x) := γ(s)γ(x), where γ(s) = 1 when 0 ≤ s ≤ T and γ(s) = 0 when T < s ≤ T + 1. Then γ satisfies all assumptions as well as (4.4) . With the coefficients γ, (1.1) admits equilibria, which is consistent with the equilibria of (1.1) with coefficients γ.
Existence of Equilibria with General Singular Controls
In this section, we prove Theorem 3.5. From Section 4, for each m ∈ (0, ∞) there exists an equilibrium P m, * for MFGs with finite fuel constraint, i.e., P m, * ∈ R m, * (µ m, * ), where µ m, * = (P m, * • (Z (1) ) −1 , P m, * • (Z (2) ) −1 , P m, * • (X (3) ) −1 ). We have the following uniform bound for p + 1 moments of Z (1) and Z (2) under P m, * . This is sufficient for the relative compactness of {P m, * • (Z Moreover, by the boundedness of l, linear growth of b (3) 
Conclusion
Motivated by optimal portfolio liquidation and optimal exploitation of exhaustible resource, we consider an extended MFG with singular controls by the probabilistic compactification mothed. We smooth the singular controls to circumvent the tightness issue. Our main result is the existence of equilibria. It is also interesting to characterize the equilibria, especially of the two examples in Section 2 so that one has better knowledge of how the representative player optimally chooses her strategy in response to the competitors. We leave the characterization as an independent work.
A 
